

# **INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT**

**ASSESSMENT  
OF THE  
REACTION CONTROL  
SYSTEM  
Vol. 3 of 5**

**26 FEBRUARY 1988**



APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11140X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11140  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6

LEAD A] ~~HARTMAN~~

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X ]  
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FAILED OFF

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11141X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11141  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
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(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11142X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11142  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-11143X	BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:	05-6KF-2036-2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11143  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11144X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11144  
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11145X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11145  
 ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11146X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11146  
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11147X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11147  
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11148X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11148  
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11149X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11149  
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11150X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11150  
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS  
TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11151X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11151  
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11152X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11152  
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11153X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11153  
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]		[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]		[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11154X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11154  
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS  
TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF  
THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11155X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11155  
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11156X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11156  
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11157X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11157  
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11158X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11158  
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11159X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11159  
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11160X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11160  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11161X	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2	NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11161  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11162X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11162  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11163X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11163  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11164X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11164  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11165X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11165  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11166X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11166  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11167X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11167  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11168X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11168  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:	FRCS-11169X	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	05-6KF-2037-1	NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:	FRCS	
MDAC ID:	11169	
ITEM:	MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15	
LEAD ANALYST:	D. HARTMAN	

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11170X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11170  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11171X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11171  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11172X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11172  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11173X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11173  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11174X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11174  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11175X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11175  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11176X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11176  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11177X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11177  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11178X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11178  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11179X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11179  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11180X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11180  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11181X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11181  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11182X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11182  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11183X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11183  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11184X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11184  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
					(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11185X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11185  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11186X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11186  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11187X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11187  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11188X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11188  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11189X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11189  
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11190X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2033-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11190  
ITEM: SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11191X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2034-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11191  
ITEM: SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PRESS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE DATA CONCERNING ULLAGE AND PRESSURES.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11192X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2157-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11192  
ITEM: METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11193X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2158-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11193  
ITEM: METER, RT OMS/RCS PRESSURE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE ACCURATE DATA CONCERNING ULLAGE AND TANK PRESSURES.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11194X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2158-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11194  
ITEM: METER, LT OMS/RCS PRESSURE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE ACCURATE DATA CONCERNING ULLAGE AND TANK PRESSURES.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11195X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2302-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11195  
ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONER OF2

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11196X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11196  
ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONER OF3

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]    [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

SIGNAL CONDITIONER NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11197X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2303-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11197  
ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONER OF4

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11198X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11198  
ITEM: JET DRIVER (PRIMARY-ALL)

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT						ITEM
HDW/FUNC			A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11199X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11199  
ITEM: JET DRIVER (PRIMARY-ALL)

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[	/	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[	/	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[	/	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11200X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11200  
ITEM: JET DRIVER (VERNIER-ALL)

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
			A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]		[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ / ]		[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ / ]		[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11201X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11201  
ITEM: JET DRIVER (VERNIER-ALL)

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[	/	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[	/	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[	/	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11202X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11202  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THESE DIODES WERE PART OF THE HELIUM TANK ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THEY BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11203X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11203  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THEY BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11204X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11204  
ITEM: MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR  
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE  
HELIUM TANK ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA  
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11205X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11205  
ITEM: MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11206X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11206  
ITEM: MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR  
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE  
TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA  
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11207X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11207  
ITEM: MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11208X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11208  
ITEM: MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR  
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE  
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA  
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11209X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11209  
ITEM: MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
-----------	-------	-------	-------	-----

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11210X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11210  
ITEM: MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR  
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE  
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA  
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11211X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252-3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11211  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA ] [ P ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY. B SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" BECAUSE ISOLATION OF A LEAK IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11212X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252-3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11212  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA ] [ P ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY. B SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" BECAUSE ISOLATION OF A LEAK IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11213X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11213  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

## REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11214X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11214  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]    [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS  
TO MEET CG LIMITS.

NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO  
THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11215X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11215  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS  
TO MEET CG LIMITS.

NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO  
THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11216X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11216  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]    [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS  
TO MEET CG LIMITS.

NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO  
THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11217X  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11217  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11218X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2270-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11218  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11219X  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
 MDAC ID: 11219  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11220X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11220  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11221X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258-3

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11221  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1302  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1302  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1303  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1303  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1304  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1304  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1305  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1305  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1306  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1306  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1307  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1307  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1308  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1308  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1309  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1309  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1310  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1310  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[ N ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1311  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1311  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1312  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1312  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1313  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1313  
 ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1314  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1314  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1315  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1315  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1316  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1316  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1317  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1317  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1318  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1318  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1319  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1319  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1320  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1320  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1321  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1321  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3	/ 3	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3	/ 3	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[	/	]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1322  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1322  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1323  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1323  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1324  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1324  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1325  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1325  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1326  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1326  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1327  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1327  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1328  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1328  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1329  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1329  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1330  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1330  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1331  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1331  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]			[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1332  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1332  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1333  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1333  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1334  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1334  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1335  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1335  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ D ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1336  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1336  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE  
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD  
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION  
OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1337  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1337  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	* [ ]
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS: ADEQUATE [ ]  
NO DIFFERENCES. INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1338  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1338  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1339  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1339  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1340  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1340  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1341  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1341  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1342  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1342  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1343  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1343  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

[ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1344  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1344  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1345  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1345  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1346  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1346  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE  
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD  
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION  
OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1347  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1347  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1348  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1348  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1349  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1349  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1350  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1350  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1351  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1351  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1352  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1352  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1353  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1353  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]	
					[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1354  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1354  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1355  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1355  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)					
	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1356  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1356  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1357  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1357  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1358  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1358  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1359  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1359  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1360  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201A-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [   ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1360  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [   ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
 INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1361  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1361  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1362  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1362  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1363  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1363  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1364  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1364  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1365  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1365  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1366  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1366  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1367  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1367  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1368  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1368  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1369  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1369  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3	/ 3	]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3	/ 3	]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ /		]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1370  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1370  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1371  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1371  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1372  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1372  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1373  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1373  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1374  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1374  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1375  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1375  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1376  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2078-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1376  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1377  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2078-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1377  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1378  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1378  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1379  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1379  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
 IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
 (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1380  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1380  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1381  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1381  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]			[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1382  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1382  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1383  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1383  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1384  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1384  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1385  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1385  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1386  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1386  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1387  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1387  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

## REMARKS:

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1388  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1388  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1389  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1389  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]			[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1390  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1390  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1391  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1391  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1392  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2078-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1392  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1393  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2078-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1393  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1394  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1394  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1395  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1395  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]			[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]			[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1396  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1396  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1397  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1397  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
			A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1398  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1398  
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1399  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1399  
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1400

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1400

ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1401

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1401

ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN

CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1402  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1402  
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:	ARCS-1403	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM:	ARCS	
MDAC ID:	1403	
ITEM:	L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN	
CONTACTS 3, 4		

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1404  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1404  
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1405  
 NASA FMEA #:  
 NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ ]  
 SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1405  
 ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE  
 CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-  
 ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1406  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1406  
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1407  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1407  
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1408  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1408  
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1409  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1409  
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1410  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1410  
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1411

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [    ]

NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1411

ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE

CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
					[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1412  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1412  
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1413  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2151-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1413  
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH TALKBACK  
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1414  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1414  
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1415  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1415  
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1416  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1416  
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1417  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1417  
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1418  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1418  
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1419  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1419  
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1420  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1420  
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1421  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1421  
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1422  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203360-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1422  
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1423  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203360-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1423  
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
			A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS: ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1424  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203360-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1424  
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1425  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203360-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1425  
 ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1426  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1426  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1427  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1427  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1428  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1428  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1429  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1429  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1430  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1430  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1431  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1431  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1432  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1432  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 DIODES  
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12086X-12101X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1433  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1433  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 DIODES  
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12086X-12101X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1434  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1434  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5  
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-  
12124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1435  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1435  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5  
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-  
12124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1436  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1436  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	* [ X ]
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5  
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12107X-  
12124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1437  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1437  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5  
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12107X-  
12124X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1438  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1438  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5  
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12107X-  
12124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1439  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1439  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5  
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-  
12124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1440  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1440  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5  
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12107X-  
12124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1441  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1441  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5  
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12107X-  
12124X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1442  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1442  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 DIODES RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12130X-12145X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1443  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1443  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12130X-12145X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1444  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1444  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12151X-12166X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1445  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1445  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
IOA	[ 3 / 2R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12151X-12166X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1446

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1446

ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES  
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12192X-12207X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1447  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1447  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES  
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12192X-12207X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1448  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1448  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD FALSELY FAILING THE VALVES CLOSED. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY DRAWN ON VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1449  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1449  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY DRAWN ON VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1450  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1450  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES  
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12208X-12223X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1451  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1451  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES  
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12208X-12223X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1452  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1452  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD FALSELY FAILING THE VALVES CLOSED. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY DRAWN ON VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1453  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1453  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY DRAWN ON  
 VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1454  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1454  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #3 DIODES  
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12224X-12239X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1455  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1455  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #3 DIODES  
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12224X-12239X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1456  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1456  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATION.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1457  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1457  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1458  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1458  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
MCA #3 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS  
12240X-12255X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1459  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1459  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
MCA #3 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS  
12240X-12255X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1460  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1460  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATION.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1461  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1461  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1462  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1462  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1463  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1463  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1464  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1464  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1465  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1465  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1466  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1466  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1467  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1467  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1468  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1468  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1469  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1469  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1470  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1470  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1471  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1471  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1472  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1472  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1473  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1473  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1474  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1474  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE  
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD  
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION  
OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1475  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1475  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1476  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1476  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1477  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1477  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1478  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1478  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFOR, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1479  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [   ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1479  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [ D ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
 INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFOR, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1480  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1480  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1481  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1481  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1482  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1482  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1483  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1483  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1484  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1484  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1485  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1485  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1666



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1486  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1486  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE  
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY  
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE  
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS  
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)  
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.  
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1487  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1487  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1488  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1488  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1489  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1489  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1490  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1490  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

## APPENDIX C

### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1491  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1491  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

### ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [       ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1492  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1492  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1493  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1493  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1494  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1494  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1495  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1495  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1496  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1496  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1497  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1497  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1498  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1498  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1499  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1499  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1500  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1500  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1501  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1501  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1502  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1502  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1503  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1503  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1504  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1504  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1505  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1505  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1506  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1506  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1507  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1507  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1508  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1508  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1509  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1509  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1510  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1510  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1511  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1511  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1512  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1512  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1513  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1513  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1514  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1514  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1515  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1515  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1516	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1516  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1517  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1517  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1518  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1518  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1519  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1519  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1520  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1520  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1521  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1521  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1522  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1522  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1523  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1523  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1524  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2003-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1524  
 ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1525  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2003-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1525  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1526  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2004-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1526  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1527  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2004-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1527  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1528  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2016-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1528  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1529  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2016-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1529  
 ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
IOA	[ 3 / 2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
COMPARE	[    / N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1530  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2016-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1530  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1531  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1531  
 ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1532  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1532  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1533  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1533  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1534  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1534  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1535  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1535  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1536  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1536  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1537  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1537  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1538  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1538  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1539  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1539  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1540  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1540  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1541  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1541  
 ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
-------------	--------	--------	--------	--------

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1542  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1542  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[ N ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [ X ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1543  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1543  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1544  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1544  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ X ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1545  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1545  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ A ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPERATIONS THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1546  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1546  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1547  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1547  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED  
OPERATIONS THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING  
AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1548  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1548  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1549  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1549  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1550  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1550  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE 3/4/5 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1551  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1551  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
					[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
DISAGREE WITH BOTH. INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION  
OF A LEAK.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1552  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1552  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N / ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY SECOND LEG OF 3/4/5 AND CROSSFEED LEG. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1553  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1553  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[   ]	[ N ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1554  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1554  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE 3/4/5 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1555  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1555  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ X ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
DISAGREE WITH BOTH. INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION  
OF A LEAK.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1556  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1556  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /   ]	[   ]	[ N ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ F ]      [ P ]      [ X ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY SECOND LEG OF 3/4/5 AND CROSSFEED LEG. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1557  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1557  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1738



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1558  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1558  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK. NOTE: NASA FMEA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIES RELAY 56V76A116K44. IT SHOULD BE 56V76A116K46.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1559  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1559  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1560  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1560  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1561  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1561  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1562  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1562  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1563  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1563  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1564  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1564  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1565  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1565  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1746



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1566  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1566  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1567  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1567  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1568  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1568  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA ] [ P ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE  
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS  
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)  
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.  
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1569  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1569  
 ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1570  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1570  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1571  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1571  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 2 /2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1572  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1572  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1573  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1573  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1574  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1574  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH, LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1575  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1575  
 ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1576  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1576  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (1/1 ABORT)

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1577  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1577  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1578  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1578  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ NA ]	[ P ]	[ D ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH, LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1579  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1579  
 ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1580  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1580  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (1/1 ABORT)

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1581  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1581  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1582  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1582  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA ] [ P ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,  
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF  
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER  
LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS  
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)  
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.  
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1583  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1583  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1584  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1584  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (1/1 ABORT)

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1585  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1585  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1586  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1586  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (1/1 ABORT)

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1587  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1587  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
					(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1588  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1588  
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]      [ NA ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,  
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF  
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER  
LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS  
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)  
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.  
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1589  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1589  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1590  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1590  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1591  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1591  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1592  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1592  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1593  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1593  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1594  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1594  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1595  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1595  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1776

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1596  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1596  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1597  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1597  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1778



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1598  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1598  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT CREDIBLE. IOA  
RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1599  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1599  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1600  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1600  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1601  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1601  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1602  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1602  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1603  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1603  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1604  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1604  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1605  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1605  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1606  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1606  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1607  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1607  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]		[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1608  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1608  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1609  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1609  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1610  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1610  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1611  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1611  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1612  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1612  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1613  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1613  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1614  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1614  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1615  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1615  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1616  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1616  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1617  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1617  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1618  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1618  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1619  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1619  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1620  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1620  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1621  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1621  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1622  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1622  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1623  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1623  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1624  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1624  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1625  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1625  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1626  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1626  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1627  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1627  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1628  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1628  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1629  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1629  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1630  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1630  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1631  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1631  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1632  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1632  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1633  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1633  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1634  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1634  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1635  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1635  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
-----------	-------	-------	-------	-------

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1636  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1636  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1637  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1637  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1638  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1638  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1639  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1639  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1640  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1640  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1641  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1641  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1642  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1642  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1643  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1643  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1644  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1644  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA  
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1645  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1645  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1646  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1646  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA  
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1647  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1647  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1648  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1648  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1649  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1649  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1650  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1650  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA  
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1651  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1651  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1652  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1652  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1653  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1653  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1654  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1654  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1655  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1655  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE  
CLOSED.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1656  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1656  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1657  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1657  
 ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1658  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1658  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1659  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1659  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1660  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1660  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1661  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1661  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1662  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1662  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA  
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1663  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1663  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1664  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1664  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
-----------	--------	--------	--------	--------

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA  
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1665  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1665  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1666  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1666  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1667  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1667  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1668  
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1668  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA  
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON  
1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1669  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1669  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1670  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1670  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1671  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1671  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1672  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1672  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1673  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1673  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1674  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1674  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1675  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1675  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1676  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1676  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1677  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1677  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1678  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1678  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1679  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1679  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1680  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1680  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1681  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1681  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1682  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1682  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1683  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1683  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1684  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1684  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
-------------	--------	--------	--------	--------

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1685  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1685  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1686  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1686  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1687  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1687  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1688  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1688  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1689  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1689  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1690  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1690  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1691  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1691  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1692  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1692  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)					
	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1693  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1693  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1694  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1694  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1695  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1695  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1696  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1696  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1697  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1697  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1698  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1698  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1699  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1699  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1700  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1700  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1701  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1701  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1702  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1702  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1703  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1703  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1884

C-6

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1704  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1704  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1705  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1705  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1706  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1706  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1707  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1707  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1708  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1708  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1709  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1709  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1710  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1710  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1711  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1711  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1892

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1712  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1712  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1713  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1713  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1714  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1714  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1715  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1715  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1716  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1716  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1717  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1717  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1718  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1718  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1719  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1719  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1720  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1720  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1721  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1721  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1902

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1722  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1722  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1723  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1723  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1724  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1724  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1725  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1725  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1726  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1726  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1727  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1727  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [ P ]      [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1728  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1728  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1729  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1729  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1730  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1730  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.  
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS  
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER  
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1731  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1731  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1732  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1732  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1733  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1733  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1734  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1734  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1735  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1735  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1736  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1736  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1737  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1737  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1738	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1738  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS	CIL ITEM
		A	B	C
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1739  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1739  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1740  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1740  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1741  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1741  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1742  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1742  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1743  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1743  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1744  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1744  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1745  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1745  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1746  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1746  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1747  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1747  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1748  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1748  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1749

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1749

ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1750  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1750  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS  
1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1751  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1751  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS  
1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1752

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1752

ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1753  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1753  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1754  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1754  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1755

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1755

ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE

CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1756  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1756  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS  
7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	* [ ]
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1757  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1757  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS  
7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1758  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1758  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1759

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1759

ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS  
9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
			A	B	C	
NASA	[	/	[	[	[	* [ ]
IOA	[ 3	/3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ N	/N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[     /     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]     [     ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1760  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1760  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1761  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1761  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1762

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [    ]

NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1762

ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1763	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS	
MDAC ID: 1763	
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH	

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS	CIL ITEM
		A            B            C	
NASA [    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1764  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1764  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12102X-12106X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1765  
 NASA FMEA #: NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1765  
 ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN  
 CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
 BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1766  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1766  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	* [ ]
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12102X-12106X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1767  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1767  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12102X-12106X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1768  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1768  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12102X-12106X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1769  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1769  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH  
CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED  
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1770

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [   ]

NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1770

ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH

CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1771	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1771  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1772  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1772  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1773  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1773  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1774  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1774  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1775	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1775  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1776

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [   ]

NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1776

ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC

CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	ARCS-1777	BASELINE	[   ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[   ]

SUBSYSTEM:           ARCS  
MDAC ID:             1777  
ITEM:                L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS:   (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1778  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1778  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	* [ ]
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1779  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1779  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1780  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1780  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1781	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1781  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1782  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1782  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1783  
 NASA FMEA #:  
 NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [    ]  
 SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1783  
 ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC  
 CONTACTS 9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1784  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1784  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1785  
 NASA FMEA #:  
 NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ ]  
 SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1785  
 ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE  
 CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1786  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1786  
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12167X-12171X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1787	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1787  
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12167X-12171X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1788  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1788  
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR  
FEED FROM LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12167X-12171X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1789  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1789  
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR  
FEED FROM LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE  
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12167X-12171X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1790  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1790  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1791  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1791  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1792  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1792  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1793	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS	
MDAC ID: 1793	
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN	
CONTACTS 1, 2	

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1794	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS	
MDAC ID: 1794	
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN	
CONTACTS 1, 2	

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1795 BASELINE [ ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1795  
 ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC  
 CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1796  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1796  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1797  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1797  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	* [ X ]
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	ARCS-1798	BASELINE	[   ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[   ]
SUBSYSTEM:	ARCS		
MDAC ID:	1798		
ITEM:	L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE		
CONTACTS	5, 6		

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1799 BASELINE [ ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1799  
 ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN  
 CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1800  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1800  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

## APPENDIX C

### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1801

NASA FMEA #:

**NASA DATA:**

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

**SUBSYSTEM:**

**ARCS**

MDAC ID:

1801

**ITEM:**

L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC

**CONTACTS 9, 10**

**LEAD ANALYST:**

**ASSESSMENT:**

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1802  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1802  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1803

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1803

ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1804  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1804  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1805

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1805

ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12172X-12176X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1806  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1806  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12172X-  
12176X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1807  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1807  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-12176X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1808  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1808  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12172X-  
12176X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1809  
 NASA FMEA #: NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1809  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
 CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12172X-  
 12176X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1810  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1810  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-  
12176X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1811 BASELINE [ ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1811  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC  
 CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12172X-  
 12176X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1812  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1812  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12172X-  
12176X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	ARCS-1813	BASELINE	[   ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[   ]
SUBSYSTEM:	ARCS		
MDAC ID:	1813		
ITEM:	MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE		
CONTACTS	5, 6		

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-12176X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1814	BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1814  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12177X-12181X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1815	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1815  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA [    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ]		[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]		[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12177X-12181X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1816	BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1816  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS	CIL ITEM
	A	B	C
NASA [   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[   ]
INADEQUATE	[   ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1817

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1817

ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN

CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12177X-12181X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1818  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1818  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12177X-12181X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1819  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1819  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1820  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1820  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1821

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1821

ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
				A	B	C	
NASA	[	/	]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	* [ ]
IOA	[ 3	/3	]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ N	/N	]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12177X-12181X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1822

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [    ]

NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1822

ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]		[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]		[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]		[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12177X-12181X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1823	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1823  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A            B            C		
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]    *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]    [    ]    [    ]		[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	
					(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1824  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1824  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-  
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12182X-12186X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1825  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1825  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1826

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [   ]

NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1826

ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1827  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1827  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	(ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	ARCS-1828	BASELINE	[ ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[ ]
SUBSYSTEM:	ARCS		
MDAC ID:	1828		
ITEM:	MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC		
CONTACTS	3, 4		

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[ ]
INADEQUATE	[ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12182X-12186X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1829	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS	
MDAC ID: 1829	
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC	
CONTACTS 3, 4	

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	ARCS-1830	BASELINE	[ ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW	[ ]
SUBSYSTEM:	ARCS		
MDAC ID:	1830		
ITEM:	MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE		
CONTACTS	5, 6		

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[ ]
INADEQUATE	[ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12182X-12186X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1831

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1831

ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1832

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1832

ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-12191X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1833  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1833  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-  
12191X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1834  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1834  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-  
12191X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:		NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:	ARCS-1835	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:		NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM:	ARCS	
MDAC ID:	1835	
ITEM:	MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN	
COMMAND 1, 2		

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-12191X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1836  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1836  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
COMMAND 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12187X-  
12191X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1837

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1837

ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC

COMMAND 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-12191X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1838

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1838

ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC

COMMAND 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-12191X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1839  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1839  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
COMMAND 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12187X-  
12191X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1840  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1840  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
COMMAND 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE  
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12187X-  
12191X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1841  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1841  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1842  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1842  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	* [ ]
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1843  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1843  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1844

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1844

ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN

CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1845  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1845  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1846  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1846  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1847 BASELINE [    ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1847  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC  
 CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
 IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1848

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [   ]

NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1848

ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1849 BASELINE [ ]  
 NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1849  
 ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
 CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
 IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1850  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1850  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1851	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #:	NEW [    ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS	
MDAC ID: 1851	
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN	
CONTACTS 7, 8	

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N / N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	(ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1852  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [    ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1852  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	* [    ]
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1853

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]

NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1853

ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1854  
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1854  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1855

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [     ]

NEW [     ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS

MDAC ID: 1855

ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ F ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ N /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [     ]  
INADEQUATE [     ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE  
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1856  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2159-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1856  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH  
TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AGREE WITH IOA ANALYSIS.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1857  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2153-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1857  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1858  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2154-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1858  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH  
TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1858A	BASELINE [    ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2154-2	NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS	
MDAC ID: 1858	
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH	
TALKBACK	

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] (ADD/DELETE)
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## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[    ]
INADEQUATE	[    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1859  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2155-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1859  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH  
TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ N /    ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1859A  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2155-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1859  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH  
TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1860  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1860  
ITEM: L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1861  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1861  
ITEM: L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1862  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [   ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1862  
 ITEM: L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
 INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1863  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1863  
 ITEM: L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1864  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1864  
ITEM: L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1865  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1865  
ITEM: L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1866  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1866  
ITEM: L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1867  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1867  
 ITEM: L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1868  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1868  
ITEM: L/R FU TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1869  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1869  
ITEM: L/R FU TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1870  
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1870  
ITEM: L/R OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1871  
 NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1871  
 ITEM: L/R OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1872  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1872  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[ ]
INADEQUATE	[ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY  
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS  
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)  
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.  
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1873  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1873  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1874  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1874  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY  
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS  
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)  
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.  
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1875  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1875  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1876  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1876  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1877  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1877  
 ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1878  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1878  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1879  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1879  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS: ADEQUATE [ ]  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1880  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1880  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1881  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1881  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1882  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1882  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	A	B	C	
NASA1224H[ /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE [    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1883  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1883  
 ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1884  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1884  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ D&a4680H ] (ADD/DELETE)
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\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1885  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1885  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1886  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1886  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1887  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1887  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1888  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1888  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1889  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1889  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1890  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1890  
 ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1891  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1891  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1892  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1892  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1893  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1893  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1894  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1894  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1895  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1895  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1896  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1896  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY  
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS  
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)  
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.  
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1897  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1897  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1898  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1898  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1899  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1899  
 ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1900  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1900  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY  
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS  
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)  
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.  
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1901  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1901  
 ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1902  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1902  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1903  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1903  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1904  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1904  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1905  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1905  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
-------	-----	-----	-----	-----

(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1906  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1906  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY  
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS  
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)  
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.  
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1907  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1907  
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1908  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1908  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1909  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1909  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1910  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1910  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1911  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1911  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1912  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1912  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1913  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1913  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1914  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1914  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1915  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1915  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1916  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1916  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
FLIGHT					ITEM
HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1917  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1917  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1918  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2271-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1918  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1919  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2271-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1919  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1920  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1920  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1921  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1921  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1922  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1922  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1923  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1923  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1924  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1924  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1925  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1925  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1926  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1926  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1927  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1927  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1928  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1928  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1929  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1929  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1930  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1930  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    / N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1931  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1931  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1932  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1932  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1933  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1933  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1934  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1934  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1935  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1935  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1936  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [   ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1936  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
 INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1937  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1937  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1938  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1938  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1939  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1939  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1940  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1940  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1941  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1941  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1942  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1942  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1943  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1943  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1944  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1944  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1945  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1945  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1946  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2271-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1946  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1947  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2271-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1947  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1948  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1948  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1949  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1949  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1950  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1950  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1951  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1951  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1952  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1952  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1953  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1953  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1954  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1954  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1955  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1955  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1956  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1956  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1957  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1957  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1958  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1958  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1959  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1959  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1960  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1960  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1961  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1961  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1962  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1962  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1963  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1963  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1964  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1964  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1965  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1965  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1966  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1966  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ / N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1967  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1967  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1968  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1968  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ / ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1969  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1969  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1970  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1970  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1971  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1971  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1972  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1972  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1973  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1973  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1974  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1974  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1975  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1975  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1976  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1976  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1977  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1977  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1978  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1978  
 ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 / 3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1979  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1979  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ] [    ] [    ] [    ] [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1980  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1980  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [    ]      [    ]      [    ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1981  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1981  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1982  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1982  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1983  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1983  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1984  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [ ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1984  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
 NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING  
 ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS  
 DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)  
 WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.  
 THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1985  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1985  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1986  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1986  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1987  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1987  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1988  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1988  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[   ]	[ N ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1989  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1989  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1990  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1990  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1991  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1991  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1992  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1992  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1993  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1993  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
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(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1994  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1994  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /N ]	[   ]	[ N ]	[   ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING  
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS  
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)  
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.  
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1995  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1995  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1996  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1996  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1997  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [   ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 1997  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[   /   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
 INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1998  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1998  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1999  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1999  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2000  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2000  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [ D ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2001  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 2001  
 ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 NO DIFFERENCES.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2002  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2002  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]	[ N ]

## RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ D ]
				(ADD/DELETE)

## \* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2003  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2003  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 2 / 2 ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
NO DIFFERENCES.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2004  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2004  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2005  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2005  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2006  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2009-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2006  
ITEM: FUSE, 2A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2007  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2009-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2007  
ITEM: FUSE, 2A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARC-2008  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2008  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2009  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2009  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2010  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2010  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2011  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2011  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]	[    ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2012  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [   ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2012  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[   ]
COMPARE	[   /N ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]	[   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[   /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]  
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
 ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2013  
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1

NASA DATA:  
 BASELINE [    ]  
 NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
 MDAC ID: 2013  
 ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ]
COMPARE	[    /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
 (ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
 INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
 IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2014  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2009-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [    ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2014  
ITEM: FUSE, 2A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[    ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[    ]	[ N ]	[    ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[    /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [    ]  
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2015  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2015  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

## REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2016  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2016  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

# APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2017  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2017  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

## ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[ 3 /1R ]	[ P ]	[ F ]	[ P ]	[ X ] *
IOA	[ 3 /2R ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ P ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[ /N ]	[ ]	[ N ]	[ ]	[ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

\* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.



